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1.  This  paper suggests that Europe  (EC  12)  is ready for a 
re-acceleration of  economic  growth.  GNP  growth in the course of 
the  1990s  may  well approximate the rates achieved in the  1960s. 
The  main  arguments  supporting this proposition will be elaborated 
in the main part of the paper.  We  start with a  diagnosis  and  con-
clude with a  description of the policy measures which are thought 
to be necessary for achieving the optimistic growth target. 
II.  Diagnosis 
2.  Europe's  long upswing  - from  the late 1940s  to the early 
1970s  - was  conditioned by three factors: 
(i)  the ambitions  and motivations of  a  postwar generation; 
(ii)  a  process of  catching up 
(iii) 
.  with the past  (reconstruction)  and 
with the best-practice technologies in the leading 
country  (the U.S.);  and 
a  process of economic  integration 
.  which started with the Marshall  Plan and  intra-Euro-
pean trade liberalisation under the auspices of the 
Organisation for  European  Economic  Co-operation 
(OEEC)  and 
.  which  culminated in the completion of the  EEC  customs 
union ahead of  schedule in 1968. 
3.  Europe's  long upswing  came  to an end -2-
(i)  when  a  new  generation brought about a  change in the 
economic  climate subsequent to the 1968  student revolt 
- with a  shift of emphasis  from output growth to income 
redistribution; 
(ii)  when  markets  slowed down  at the end of  the catching-up 
process while governments  raised taxes,  and while la-
bour market organisations pushed wages  and related la-
bour costs to move  faster than warranted by the trend 
growth of output per manhour; 
(iii)  when  the gains  from market integration were exhausted 
and  Europe's  terms  of trade deteriorated under the im-
pact of the oil price explosion in the world-wide  boom 
of  1973. 
Our interpretation of history takes these changes  as  endogenous 
consequences  of prior developments,  not as  exogenous  shocks. 
4.  The  diagnosis of  slower growth in the  1970s  and early 
1980s must  focus  on the following points: 
(i)  Profit margins declined under the pressure of rising 
costs of  labour,  energy and pollution control. 
(ii)  The  real rate of interest was  depressed, 
(iii) 
(iv) 
.  partly under the impact of the world-wide redistribu-
tion of  incomes  in favour of oil-rich countries and  a 
hurried recycling of petrodollars, 
..  partly as  a  result of monetary acceleration and  unan-
ticipated inflation  (exploitation of money  illusion). 
Capital was  wasted in housing construction as  a  means 
of obtaining inflation-proof assets. 
An  excessive capital deepening took place:  instead of 
creating enough  new  jobs  for new entrants to the labour 
force,  firms  in Europe  concentrated on making existing -3-
jobs more  productive,  quite in accordance with the dis-
tortion of relative factor prices. 
(v)  Wage-induced  shedding of  the least productive workers 
gave  a  boost to average  labour productivity - as it is 
measured  - thus masking the true extent of the produc-
tivity slowdown. 
(vi)  Under the impact of cost pressures technological pro-
gress was  biassed towards  process  innovations  - at the 
expense of product innovations. 
(vii) 
(viii) 
In the category of process  innovation,  technical pro-
gress was  biassed towards  labour saving at the expense 
of capital saving innovations,  again in line with the 
distortion of relative factor prices. 
Instead of market liberalisation,  a  new wave  of  protec-
tionism emerged in the international field  (NTBs)  as 
well as  in the sheltered domestic  sectors in Europe 
(overregulation)  including the labour market  (job pro-
tection)  .  European corporatism flourished at the ex-
pense of outsiders,  i.e.  of  foreigners  or of  long-term 
unemployed at home. 
(ix)  "Eurosclerosis"  became the label to diagnose  Europe's 
economic inflexibility in the trap of  slow growth  and 
high unemployment. 
(x)  Governments,  the welfare state and macroeconomic  poli-
cies  became discredited.  They were widely perceived to 
have  been oversold,  overexpanded or misapplied.  Defi-
cits, debts  and  taxes  became  as  bad words  in the late 
1970s  as profits,  prices and business had  been  a  decade 
before. 
5.  In the course of  the 1980s,  some  of the defects were  rem-
edied: (i) 
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The  prevailing economic  policy perspective shifted away 
from  Keynes  towards  Schumpeter and  Hayek.  Enterpreneurs 
and  innovators gained social prestige. 
(ii)  In search of the regenerative forces,  participants in 
the policy debate shifted focus  from  demand  to supply, 
including the supply of entrepreneurship. 
(iii)  The  EC  Commission propagated their co-operative growth 
strategy for more  employment,  calling for wage  modera-
tion,  with support  from  the social partners. 
(iv)  Flexibility - of markets  and within firms  - was  in-
creasingly seen as  an  important condition for economic 
performance. 
(v)  The  share of  government  in total domestic  expenditure 
was  lowered in many  countries to make  room  for more 
private investment. 
(vi)  Budget deficits were  reduced as  a  percentage of  GNP 
(partly as  a  reaction to the high real rates of inter-
est that prevailed when  the inflationary overhang  from 
the 1970s was  attacked by the disinflationary policies 
of the early 1980s). 
(vii) 
(viii) 
Tax  reforms  - either to shift the weight to consumption 
taxes or to broaden the  income  tax base for  lower rates 
- were carried out to strengthen the supply of  savings 
and capital or of skill and entrepreneurship. 
The wave  of deregulation,  initiated by Carter in the 
1970s,  gave rise to imitating efforts in Europe. 
(ix)  Greece,  Portugal and  Spain were  admitted to the E.C.  -
an undertaking which is  (partly)  equivalent to the lib-
eralisation efforts in the  1950s  and  1960s  in the sense 
that it gave rise to more  (healthy)  import competition (x) 
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from countries in Europe which were  ready to start a 
process of catching up. 
The  European court established the principle of the 
country of origin while  EC  members  agreed to mutually 
recognise their technical standards and  norms. 
(xi)  The  1985  EC  White  Book  on  the Internal Market paved the 
way  for a  liberal  (market oriented)  interpretation of 
Europe's  integration goals.  The  Single European Act 
made  the programme  stick. 
(xii) 
(xiii) 
(xiv) 
The  E.M.S.  proved  a  success in the fight against infla-
tion under the implicit leadership of the Bundesbank. 
Inflation rates declined in the whole  OECD  area,  and 
Europe's  terms  of trade improved  thanks  to the decline 
in oil prices and the  low prices of  raw materials. 
Wage  moderation in Europe helped to raise profit expec-
tations  - and expected returns  from physical investment 
in Europe  - over and  above  the real rate of interest 
that could be earned on  financial assets  (and hence 
elsewhere in the world).  Europe  thus  became more  com-
petitive for internationally mobile resources despite 
the international crowding-out effect of the u.s.  bud-
get deficit. 
(xv)  The  world  economic  environment  improved  - with reforms 
in China,  Glasnost and Perestroika in the Soviet Union, 
the success of small  (and hence more  open)  countries in 
the Far East,  the employment miracle in the u.s.,  the 
free trade agreement in North America,  the skillful 
handling of the international debt crisis. 
(xvi)  The  stock market crash of October 19,  1987,  proved to 
be  a  confidence test:  instead of  a  recession it gener-
ated an unexpected prosperity thanks  to the monetary (xvii) 
(xviii) 
(xix) 
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policies pursued in response to the fear of an emerging 
liquidity trap. 
1988  thus  became the year with the highest GNP  growth 
rate in the 1980s  (4  % in the world's industrial coun-
tries)  and  a  world trade growth even much  faster  (9  % 
in volume  terms). 
High capacity utilisation rates give strong investment 
impulses;  and high real interest rates ensure that the 
investment will be capital widening rather than capital 
deepening and will create more  productive  jobs  than it 
was  the case in the 1970s when  the relation between 
wages  and interest rates produced a  labour saving bias. 
Europe  in 1989  is likely to produce almost as much  real 
growth as in 1988,  thanks  to the capital widening  com-
ponent in the flow of  investments  and  thanks  to the 
flexibility efforts that will be undertaken in areas 
where  capacity constraints are strongly felt. 
(xx)  These efforts can be expected in the labour market as 
well as in the supply of  goods  and  services when  firms 
and workers,  perhaps  even  labour unions  and regulating 
governments  on the provincial and  local level, will 
become  increasingly aware of the wider and more  intense 
competition they have to reckon with after 1992.  Euro-
pessimism and  Eurosclerosis tend to be overcome by 
Eurooptimism. 
(xxi) 
(xxii) 
With given profit expectations,  firms  in Europe do  not 
seem to be overindebted;  and world financial markets 
have not yet overvalued Europe's equity capital. 
The  present merger movement  can be taken to indicate a 
productivity potential from  synergy effects and  from 
unexploited computer facilities.  It is said with plaus-
ibility that the computer can be  seen everywhere but -7-
hitherto not in the productivity statistics. As  this is 
likely to be true,  the computer's full productivity 
potential will be revealed in the foreseeable  future in 
the more  integrated internal market. 
III.  The Potential Growth of Potential Output in E.C.  Europe 
6.  The  maximum  scope for faster growth in the  1990s  can be 
judged by considering 
(i)  the past trend rate of output growth per person employ-
ed  (labour productivity); 
(ii)  an  increase of this trend rate in the future made  pos-
sible by 
(iii) 
changes  in the number of hours  worked, 
.  a  faster rise in the capital intensity or a  faster 
rise in capital productivity, 
.  an accelerated improvement  in qualifications  (human 
capital intensity)  or a  better use of qualifications 
(human  capital productivity), 
.  a  faster intersectoral shift of resources  from de-
clining activities to high productivity activities; 
an increase in the number of persons  employed 
.  from  the pool of the unemployed, 
.  from  the number of persons in the working age  group, 
.  from  a  rise in participation rates, 
.  from  immigration. 
7.  In the  EC  (12),  the trend rate of output growth per per-
son  employed  (productivity)  has  been around  two per cent for the 
last fifteen years,  less than half as  high as  in the period  1960 
to  1973,  when it was  4.5 per cent.  In this respect,  Europe  holds 
a  middle position between Japan and the u.s.  (European  Economy 
No.  38,  Table  20)  which equally experienced a  productivity slow-
down  after 1973.  This  slowdown  is still-largely a  mystery unless -8-
it is seen as  a  consequence rather than a  cause of the  slowdown 
in output growth.  As  a  consequence,  the trend rate of productivi-
ty advance is likely to rise once the overall conditions  for 
growth have markedly improved. 
8.  The  theory behind this view is implicit in the diagnosis 
presented at the beginning of this paper and  can be  summarised as 
follows:  A combination of  favourable  conditions  leads to a  vir-
tuous  circle in the sense that markets  outpace rigid organisa-
tions and  governments  and,  by doing so,  make  the system more 
flexible and efficient.  More  people are forward-looking  and ad-
venturous;  they embark  upon  offensive product innovations rather 
than defensive process  innovations;  they exploit the advantages 
of specialisation in expanding markets  instead of  looking for 
safeguards  and  job protection in a  shrinking or stagnating envi-
ronment.  While there is induced protection when  market expansion 
slows  down,  induced opportunities for openness,  entrepreneurship 
and  dynamism arise when  market developments  accelerate.  Note, 
however,  that induced protection does  not only take the  form of 
explicit or implicit cartels and voluntary restraint agreements, 
but also of government regulation and outright government inter-
vention  (in the name  of orderly markets  and  fairness,  usually at 
the expense of outsiders)  and,  equally important,  in the  form of 
government  subsidies.  Therefore,  the growth opportunities needed 
to accelerate the productivity advance  have to be actively opened 
up  by deregulation and  liberalisation in the economy and  by pri-
vatising business  and  employment risks. 
9.  The  time  for  such activities has  come,  for the following 
reasons: 
(i)  the expansionary monetary policy after the crash of 
October 19,  1987,  gave rise to a  demand  boost all over 
the world,  bringing about an economic  tide that,  so to 
speak,  lifts all boats; 
(ii)  supply responsiveness is now  being tested by the mar-
ket; (iii) 
-9-
the best means  to fight inflation is to remove  restric-
tions  on  the supply side and to make  markets  more  open 
for more  intense competition. 
10.  If timely measures  are taken in the immediate  future, 
Europe's  trend rate of productivity growth  could presumably be 
raised by a  half and even by one percentage point to approximate 
the three per cent that Europe  achieved a  decade ago  in the sec-
ond half of the  1970s.  This  implies that the shortening of the 
work  week  which  took place in response to the past decline of 
employment  opportunities will be discontinued,  though not revers-
ed. 
11.  Several calculations by the Kiel  Institute confirm that 
the order of magnitude may  be right. 
o  An  international cross  section analysis of effective protection 
as it prevailed in the 1960s  and  1970s  leads to the conclusion 
that this protection did cost the world  two  percentage points 
in terms  of  economic  growth  foregone  each year  (Heitger 1987). 
The  loss may  have  been  lower for the industrialised countries 
and higher for LDCs  with a  catching-up potential. 
o  The  very moderate tax reform in Germany to be  completed by  1990 
is estimated to have  a  positive supply effect of  0.2  percentage 
points of potential output growth  (Boss  1988).  More  would  have 
yielded more;  and additional steps could be taken in the fu-
ture. 
o  Finally,  a  programme  of cutting subsidies  - and  simultaneously 
the  income  taxes needed to finance  them  - by half was  estimated 
to substantially raise employment  through its effect on the 
allocation of  investment resources  and  on the overall produc-
tivity of  investment  (Gerken  1985). 
12.  A large scope for increasing total factor productivity 
could be  presumed to emerge if government decided to shift the 
tax burden  from  income  taxes to pollution taxes as the former - 10-
impair incentives while the latter have the positive side effect 
of raising total factor productivity as  they are a  superior sub-
stitute for the costly administrative pollution controls that are 
applied in Europe  and that may  well  have  contributed to the pro-
ductivity slowdown. 
13.  The  completion of the internal common  market  by the end 
of  1992  can be taken as  a  salutary productivity shock.  The  addi-
tional intensity of competition to be expected is likely to re-
sult in a  faster productivity advance,  apart  from the upward 
shift in the path of potential output growth by two  to three per 
cent that has  been estimated to result,  as  a  once-and-for-all 
effect,  from  the removal  of border controls.  Why  should we  then 
not anticipate a  potential for four per cent output growth  (per 
person employed)  in 1993  and take this as  a  step towards  a  steep-
er path of potential output growth in subsequent years?  An affir-
mative answer would,  of course,  be contingent upon  supply in-
creasing government measures,  including privatisation and 
deregulation and  a  reduction of taxes  and subsidies,  and  upon 
successful attempts to resist protectionist tendencies  towards  a 
"fortress Europe".  More  about this later. 
14.  A four per cent productivity advance in Europe may  well 
mean  less for the industrialised regions  and  correspondingly more 
for countries benefitting from  a  catching up process.  When  EUR  12 
had  a  productivity growth of  4.5 per cent on average between  1960 
and  1973,  less industrialised countries like Greece,  Portugal and 
Spain  showed  a  much  superior performance of around  7  per cent, 
i.e. fifty per cent better than the average.  Would  a  productivity 
growth of  6  per cent in the lesser developed parts of the  EC  be 
out of the question if we  anticipate strong tendencies  to relo-
cate the production of more or less standardised goods  from the 
centre to the periphery after the markets  for capital as well as 
for labour and  goods  have  become  really free in the post-1992 
period?  My  answer is no;  we  should expect it. 
15.  But  such relocation will happen at full  speed only (i) 
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if the periphery is allowed to have wages  and wage  re-
lated costs  low enough to fully match  - and  to tempo-
rarily overcompensate  - the productivity differential 
existing vis-A-vis the more  advanced centre,  i.e., if 
in other words  - the periphery is allowed to exert 
its competitive  advantage",  and 
(ii)  if centre-periphery competition is not  impeded  by gov-
ernment subsidies to ailing industries in the centre. 
IV.  The Role of Wage  Policy 
16.  Wage  differentiation between the centre and the peri-
phery is thus essential for adequate growth.  But it is also a 
necessary condition for an  optimum allocation of resources  in the 
spatial dimension.  With  inadequate wage differentiation,  not 
enough  jobs will move  from the centre to the periphery and  cor-
respondingly more  people will move  to the centre and  look for 
jobs there  - waiting in desperate conditions at the outskirts of 
large cities or even in slum districts.  Social upheavals  and 
xenophobia,  already now  observable,  may  then become detrimental 
to European integration.  This danger should warn  us  against the 
corporatist tendencies  towards  excessive labour market  harmonisa-
tion. 
17.  The  clue to Europe's  problem of  labour market integra-
tion and productivity advance is equilibrium wages  at the peri-
phery defined as wages 
o  low enough to attract  jobs  from  the centre, 
o  low enough to attract capital  from  everywhere, 
o  low enough to bring about the state of full  employment within a 
limited number of years  so that wages  would  then subsequently 
increase under the pressure of  a  high demand  for  labour. 
18.  There is no other road to full employment and  fast pro-
ductivity growth in countries with a  high catching-up potential -12-
than the path of  relative wage  moderation  paved  by  unions  in the  centre of 
Europe  in the  1950s  under the pressures of  a  high capital shor-
tage,  unemployment  and  an  Erhard-type moral  suasion.  Would it be 
tried again at Europe's periphery four decades  later? Those who 
believe in learning from experience will be optimistic enough to 
give a  positive answer.  Here  the  EC  Commission  now  has  a  great 
role to play. 
19.  In the industrial regions  likely to suffer from there-
location of production to countries in a  catching-up process, 
wage  moderation is called for in tune with the peripheral coun-
tries,  though,  of  course,  in accordance with the higher produc-
tivity level the advanced  countries have achieved.  Such wage  mod-
eration serves  the following  purposes:  In contrast to an aggres-
sive wage policy 
o  it does  not excessively push  firms  into relocation,  thus  pre-
venting a  wage  induced export of  jobs; 
o  it does  not induce  firms  to defend their traditional locations 
by means  of excessively capital intensive process  innovations 
that destroy  jobs before new  ones  emerge; 
o  it allows  firms  to concentrate on product innovations which 
benefit employment  and  - with  some  delay - permit wage  in-
creases as  a  result; 
o  it permits  a  wage drift and hence  a  stretching of the vertical 
wage  structure which is important for offering workers  incen-
tives to undertake on-the-job training and to acquire higher 
skills; 
o  it gives  firms  greater scope for letting more  employees parti-
cipate in their profits,  by itself a  factor likely to raise 
productivity; 
o  it facilitates structural change at a  higher level of employ-
ment  by raising the effective demand  for  labour:  instead of -13-
being dismissed into the pool of  unemployed where their skills 
deteriorate,  workers  in declining industries have the option 
- of keeping their  jobs at relatively low wages  for a 
longer time,  or 
- of accepting employment offers  from  firms  in other 
lines of production or in other places where their 
skills are still highly valued; 
o  it induces  firms  to pursue an active labour market policy 
- by paying generous  fringe benefits to workers  they 
want to attract from  elsewhere,  and 
- by offering inexpensive training facilities to wor-
kers they need for more qualified  jobs. 
20.  Wage  moderation is thus  an  important element in any pol-
icy designed to accelerate the productivity advance  - at any giv-
en level of  employment.  In other words:  an excess  demand  for la-
bour  - at moderate wages  - is more  conducive to productivity 
growth  than an  excess  supply of  labour  - at excessive wages.  This 
is in accordance with Europe's  experience in the  1950s  and  1960s 
and may  contribute to understanding Europe's productivity slow-
down  in the 1970s. 
21.  It may  appear at first sight that wage  moderation is 
disadvantageous  to those who  are employed,  leaving apart the un-
employed.  But  Europe's  recent economic history shows  the oppo-
site.  The  explanation is this:  fast productivity advance  and  high 
employment  go  together because active labour market policies pur-
sued by employers  - thanks  to an excess  demand  for  labour at mod-
erate wages  - is more efficient and socially more  productive than 
active labour market policies pursued by governments  - at higher 
wages  and  a  deficient demand  for labour.  This is likely to be  so 
for the following  reasons: 
o  Under  conditions of high demand  for labour,  workers  are free to 
choose  among  different employers  who,  on their part,  do  the 
search and bear the search costs;  this is more efficient than 
the reverse arrangement because employers  are likely to have -14-
better information about future market prospects than workers; 
there are also good  reasons  to believe that a  decentralised 
search and  information system makes  a  better use of  knowledge 
about  ongoing structural changes  in the labour market  than a 
centralised system of  labour offices under  a  government mono-
poly. 
o  If a  worker decides to quit under conditions of full employment 
- at moderate wages  - he does  so in full awareness  of  the al-
ternatives he has  considered beforehand.  This is in stark con-
trast to a  dismissal under conditions of  a  deficient demand.for 
labour  - at excessive wages.  In the latter case,  the decision 
is more  often taken by the employer who  may  have many  selection 
criteria related to his  own  business,  but not the criterion 
whether the employee to be dismissed has  employment  opportuni-
ties better suited to his skills elsewhere. 
o  It is true that employers  do  complain about an  unduly high 
fluctuation rate  (or labour mobility)  when  labour is in excess 
demand  - at moderate wages.  But  such complaints  can be taken to 
indicate a  regret that investment in human  capital which  the 
firm has  paid for will be used  by another firm where the em-
ployee can  cash in, at least partly,  on the return on this in-
vestment.  This  implies that workers,  though they have  less in-
formation  on the future market for their skills and may  not 
take the initiative for investment in human  capital,  neverthe-
less can determine  from  time to time the direction that appears 
to them most in conformity with their talents and preferences. 
o  An  excess  demand  for labour in the advanced centre of  Europe  -
with high employment also at the periphery - will once again 
induce search activities with a  view to attracting guest wor-
kers.  It can be assumed that firms will then provide homes  to-
gether with work opportunities  and that workers  who  are prepar-
ed to emigrate to the centre will wait in their home  region in 
expectation of search activities from the centre. -15-
o  In the centre,  the guest worker model  offers a  kind of  imported 
labour market flexibility for the benefit of the insiders who 
can  then opt for the easier forms  of mobility:  upward mobility 
in growing  firms  without  changing  locations or carriers. 
To  sum  up and repeat:  Wage  moderation with demand  pull  from  em-
ployers does  promise better opportunities for productivity growth 
- at a  given employment  level  - than wage  pressure resulting in 
unemployment.  It will make  quite a  few  labour market regulations 
practically obsolete,  thus  amounting to a  far-reaching liberali-
sation programme. 
22.  Wage  moderation will also lead to higher employment. 
Indirectly it will occur by accelerating the growth of  labour 
productivity as described.  This  enhances  the direct effects which 
work  through higher profits and higher profit expectations  from 
the employment of additional workers.  Any  such employment effect 
will,  of  course,  raise the rate of output growth beyond the four 
per cent productivity growth suggested as  a  reasonable target so 
far.  Keeping this in mind,  the following points indicate how  the 
employment effect of wage moderation  comes  about and  how it could 
be maximised: 
o  Firms  earn higher profits,  and as profit earners have  a  higher 
propensity to save than wage  earners,  total savings are likely 
to go  up as  a  percentage of  GNP. 
o  Higher profit expectations make  domestic  firms  more eager to 
borrow for investment.  More  domestic  savings will be absorbed 
at home,  more  investible funds will be  imported.  Europe's  cur-
rent account surplus will decline or even  become  negative. 
o  The additional investment will involve the creation of  new pro-
ductive  jobs that allow additional workers  to permanently earn 
their income  and yield profits that add to savings  and invest-
ment. -16-
oReal wages  rising less than productivity- i.e., higher profit 
expectations  - will induce  firms  to hire additional workers  for 
a  more  intense use of the existing capital stock,  i.e., for  a  a 
higher capital productivity,  a  lower capital intensity of pro-
duction. 
o  A parallel effect will come  about at the margin of growth  -
additional capital will have  a  larger  job content and  hence  be 
more  labour using and more  capital saving. 
o  With  lower cost pressure,  process  innovations will appear to be 
less urgent;  hence,  more  private resources  can and will be de-
voted to product innovations that are employment  creating 
rather than  labour saving. 
o  As  a  result of higher profit expectations,  the demand  for in-
vestible funds will increase more  than savings  so that the real 
rate of interest will go  up.  Contrary to widespread beliefs,  a 
higher real rate of interest, if it comes  about in this way,  is 
employment  creating as it induces  investors to save capital 
(per unit of output and per unit of  labour)  so that a  given 
amount  of  investment yields  a  greater number  of permanent  jobs. 
o  Capital  saving induced by a  high real rate of interest can also 
take the  form of investors preferring projects with  a  shorter 
depreciation period;  and  less durable  investment makes  for less 
technological obsolescence of capital  (waste)  at a  given rate 
of technological progress. 
o  This  - together with a  more  labour friendly bias of  innovations 
- can well accelerate the absorption of  new  knowledge  by so-
ciety. 
23.  This  reasoning  shows  that Europe  can make  use of posi-
tive feedback effects that run  from productivity growth  to em-
ployment  growth  and  from  employment to productivity.  These  feed-
back effects  seem to have  been at work in the  1950s  and  1960s; 
they were turned into a  vicious circle in the  1970s  and  1980s. -17-
With determined efforts in the right direction,  the vicious cir-
cle of  the past can be  transformed into a  virtuous circle in the 
1990s.  The  simulations underlying the quantitative estimates of 
the  EC  Commission's  cooperative growth strategy take account of 
these effects though  no  simulation can  cope with the complexities 
of  a  process of mutual  reinforcement.  This is why  economists  and 
other commentators  of  dynamic  movements  sometimes  call miracles 
what  they were  unable to simulate ex ante. 
24.  The  financing of the additional investment required for 
employment  growth in EC  Europe  need not only come  from  the busi-
ness  sector,  although capital mobility within the common  market 
will contribute to making  a  better use of business  funds.  Other 
likely sources  include: 
o  capital that will come  in from  abroad once it has  become  more 
widely known  that Europe's equity capital is undervalued given 
its new  growth prospects; 
o  foreign direct investment by international firms  that will want 
to be in touch more  closely with a  prospering market; 
o  foreign  loan capital attracted by a  combination of monetary 
stability and high interest rates; 
o  government  savings that will become  available once public ex-
penditures  - thanks  to lower defence needs  and declining pover-
ty - are outpaced by GNP  growth; 
o  household  savings that can be raised by shifting the tax burden 
onto consumption taxes  - including taxes  on the use of environ-
mental  resources  - and by a  restructuring of the social securi-
tr systems with a  view to giving more  emphasis  to individual 
self-responsibility and collective capital formation. -18-
V.  Complementary Policies 
25.  There may  be  strong tendencies in Europe to pursue trade 
policies that would attract direct investment  from  abroad as  a 
consequence  and to protect employment  in sensitive industries. 
This would be the road to  "fortress  Europe".  Nothing  could be 
more  shortsighted than this approach.  A temporary boost to em-
ployment that might  be achieved could definitely cost a  high 
price in terms  of  slower long-run growth and productivity ad-
vance. 
26.  There are several reasons  to support this:  It is true 
that protection  (import protection,  subsidies and tax exemptions) 
for coal,  steel, agriculture and textiles instinctively appeal to 
consumers  who  still remember wartime  shortages of fuel,  food  and 
clothing and  may,  therefore,  be prepared to pay for it. It is 
also true that whole  regions  in Europe  - with strong voting power 
- still depend  on these activities which  once were  the basis of 
people's prosperity.  Finally,  with eleven per cent unemployment 
in Europe,  people and politicians find it difficult to believe 
that the resources used by these sectors have alternative uses 
which would yield sufficiently high returns.  But it can be  demon-
strated 
o  that any protection against imports  indirectly hurts exports in 
general  - and hence  employment  in activities with high produc-
tivity prospects in the long run; 
o  that protection makes  customer countries poorer  - in the sense 
of  being less prosperous  than they would  otherwise be  - and 
therefore impairs  the growth prospects of domestic export firms 
which concentrate on  goods  with a  high  income elasticity of 
demand,  including capital goods; 
o  that subsidies  and tax exemptions  require higher tax rates in 
general and thus  impair the incentive to work  and to acquire 
skills and  the propensities to save and to invest; -19-
o  that aid in general  - the supply of help - creates its own  de-
mand  by inducing producers to lobby for aid and  to anticipate 
aid rather than the structural change that inevitably goes 
along with economic  growth in an  open world order; 
o  that aid in this way affects the mentality and  impairs  the 
dynamism of society. 
27.  The  "fortress Europe"  danger would  hardly be worth men-
tioning in this context if the forces  behind it were not inher-
ently strong for the following  reasons: 
o  Protectionism is more deeply rooted in Europe  than in North 
America  because it fits the European traditions of  corporatism: 
the guild tradition,  the propensity to form cartels,  the con-
structivist belief in design rather than market  spontaneity, 
the anti-capitalist instincts,  the preoccupation with self-
sufficiency in times  of war,  the model  of industrial self-
governance under the guidance of  government as applied on the 
continent in World War  I  and  II,  the utopia of industrial demo-
cracy.  Corporatism requires  continuous  compromises  among  con-
flicting interests which  can best be achieved at the expense of 
outsiders who  are not represented at the bargaining table:  the 
foreigners  and the unemployed.  To  be  sure,  there are protec-
tionist tendencies in the U.S.  as well,  and they are enhanced 
by the fact that the internal market on the other side of the 
North Atlantic is so large and will become  even larger.  But the 
ideological base of protectionism in North America is weaker as 
one  can gather from  opinion polls among  members  of  the  econom-
ics profession. 
o  The  road to  "fortress Europe"  is paved by the technocratic 
quest for ex ante harmonisation within the Community.  In gen-
eral:  Harmonisation will come  about in a  natural way  by people 
living more  closely together and interacting more  intensely 
with each other in a  wider market without borders.  Population 
groups still divided by national borders will speak more with 
one voice,  use  fewer  interpreters,  imitate each others'  customs -20-
and habits more,  move  towards  more  similar norms  of behaviour 
that reduce  communication  and  transaction costs.  Nobody  can 
object to this harmonisation by trial and error,  because nobody 
is excluded or forced  to  join.  But if central authorities pre-
scribe what  norms  should be adhered to,  they must  bribe or ap-
pease those who  are inclined to object.  The  easiest way  to do 
this is to combine these  forms  of  ex ante harmonisation with 
restrictions on  imports.  Outsiders who  do  not  comply will not 
be permitted to sell.  It is true that minimum  norms  can well  be 
justified on  the grounds .of  preventing negative third party 
effects under the headings  of  safety,  health and pollution con-
trol.  But this is exactly what  makes  such  norms,  once  they have 
been unified within the EC,  an easily usuable base for new 
measures  of  import protection.  The  benefit of the doubt  and of 
tolerance will surely be on the side of protecting insiders. 
The  closing of the Community will then occur without much  ado. 
o  Premature harmonisation will lead to a  "fortress Europe"  also 
in case of the so-called  "Social  Dimension".  Surely,  if Portu-
gal can make  itself attractive for foreign direct investment 
and if its economy warrants profit expectations high  enough to 
generate an  increasing supply of domestic entrepreneurship, 
then it will embark  upon  a  fast process of catching up.  This 
will  - as  stated above  - involve a  wage  level  low enough to 
quickly absorb the domestic  unemployment.  But exports  on  the 
basis of  (temporarily)  low wages  from  a  less industrialized 
country may  easily be denounced as  "Social Dumping".  This is 
exactly what is meant  by this term in connection with the  "So-
cial Dimension".  If it were otherwise,  there would  be no  reason 
for raising the old  "social question"  in the new  context.  If 
the  "Social  Dimension"  is more  than rhetoric and if low wage 
countries within the Community are to be brought in line with 
less moderate wage  policies elsewhere,  they will have  to be 
bribed or compensated.  And  as in the case of norms,  an appar-
ently costless compensation is always  available in the  form of 
protection against imports  from outside,  here against imports 
from  countries which are even poorer and which have to pay an 
even higher price in terms  of lost opportunities for catching 
up. -21-
28.  In conclusion:  If Europe wants  to make  the best use of 
its own  growth opportunities, it will have to accept more  intense 
competition for its producers  from outside as well as  from with-
in.  The  impact of competition on growth  cannot be  successfully 
modelled and  simulated to fit the present case.  It can only be 
imagined.  But economists trained in the standard theory or re-
source allocation have little scope left in their minds  for such 
imagination.  In the trade field,  they come  up with static gains 
and  losses that look miniscule,  not high enough to convince trade 
negotiators  and politicians that unilateral disarmament in the 
field of protection is worth any consideration.  In other words: 
Harberger triangles,  even by the heap,  do  not easily add  up to a 
new  high posture for  a  better growth perspective.  Keynesian econ-
omists,  on the other hand,  tend to believe that supply is normal-
ly quite responsive to the exigencies of effective demand,  thus 
belittling the danger of inflation.  What  is necessary in these 
circumstances is to build an intellectual bridge between  supply-
micro  and demand-macro  on Schumpeterian lines:  Let us anticipate 
a  higher growth rate in Europe  on  the basis of  Europe  92  and move 
towards  the opening of markets  for more  competition  from  inside 
and  from  abroad as  the main element in an anti-inflation stra-
tegy. 
29.  On  any anti-protectionist agenda  for faster growth with-
out inflation,  agriculture will have to figure high.  The  road 
towards world market prices for agricultural products has to be 
travelled with increasing speed in the near future: 
o  to lower the cost of  living increases that may  well  feed  into 
wage  and cost pressures in non-farm sectors; 
o  to reduce the wasteful surplus production in Europe  and the 
financial  burden arising  from it; 
o  to lower the intensity of  land use for environmental  reasons; 
o  to make  land available at lower prices for reforestation; -n-
o  to release entrepreneurial talent from agriculture where it 
appears to be in a  blind alley;  and 
o  to remove  an obstacle to progress in the Uruguay Round  of  GATT 
negotiations. 
30.  Progress  towards world market prices is inevitable.  It 
could well  be accelerated if landowners  and  farmers  received full 
compensation  - step by step and without delay - for the loss of 
net income or wealth they would  suffer each time when  prices were 
lowered.  In order to simplify matters,  a  ten per cent reduction 
in the price of product A could be  taken to imply a  ten per cent 
loss in net  income,  assuming that the cost bill would  be cut in 
proportion.  Compensation  could be granted in the  form of  a  de-
ficiency payment  for a  period to be defined or as  a  wealth  com-
pensation in the  form of  government  bonds,  with a  nominal inter-
est rate at the market level.  A once-and-for-all switch to world 
market prices would not be excluded.  In this case,  down  payments 
would  have to be arranged for,  and the best solution would  then 
be to grant compensation in the  form of  government  bonds  so that 
landowners  had  the option to sell them and to make  those invest-
ments  that would  become profitable at lower  land prices. 
31.  The  EC  Commission would  be well advised to set up  an 
independent task force  for solving the problems  of agricultural 
reform  - a  task force  independent of the agricultural  lobby.  If 
the  CAP  in its present form is wasteful,  a  faster move  towards 
world market prices would  be  a  gain for the taxpayer and  consumer 
as well as  for the truly entrepreneurial element in Europe's ag-
ricultural population.  Most  important of all, this reform would 
help to accelerate Europe's  economic  growth in the  1990s  by re-
allocating resources  and  by making  Europe more  open to meet the 
challenges and to exploit the vast opportunities of  economic 
growth in the world at large. -23-
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